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the motion was under advisement, Mounteer filed a motion to amend
the complaint, together with a proposed amended complaint,

R.

103; R. 41. On August 17, 1987, The Honorable Richard H. Moffat,
by a minute entry, granted UP&L's motion without prejudice,
107.

R.

On August 21, 1987, the trial court, sua sponte, struck as

moot the motion to amend the complaint.
At

the time the

action was dismissed, Mounteer

in his

pleadings had presented to the Court the provable state of facts.
The fatal defects identified in those pleadings were precisely
those allegsitions which the judge ordered be incorporated into
the order of dismissal.

Order upon Plaintiff's Objections, R.

123; Order and Judgment of Dismissal, R. 125.
The following allegations in the complaint comprised the
factual support for Mounteerfs causes of action.
1.

At all times relevant to the causes of action alleged,

Larsen was a UP&L employee and was acting in the course and scope
of her employment.
2.

Complaint 5 3, R. 2.

At all times relevant to the causes of action alleged,

Mounteer was a UP&L employee and was acting in the course and
scope of his employment.
3.

Larsen was

instructed

plaintiff for drug use.
investigation.
4.

Complaint 55 4, 5 and 7, R. 3, 4.
by UP&L to

"investigate" the

UP&L had specific policies for such an

Complaint 55 7 and 16, R. 4, 5.

Larsen!s conduct about which Mounteer complains was in

violation of UP&L policy.

Complaint 55 7 and 16, R. 4, 5.
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5.

Larsen's conduct was intentional, grossly negligent,

malicious, outrageous, and reckless. Complaint J5 17, 19 and 21,
R. 5, 6.
6.

Larsen

about Mounteer.
7.

knowingly

made

false, defamatory

statements

Complaint ff 7 and 8, R. 4.

Even after being advised that her communication was

being broadcast broadly

and not to a particular

supervisor,

"Larsen persisted and continued to make [false] allegations to
the effect that plaintiff was on drugs."
8.

Mounteer

principle.
9.

Complaint 3 7, R. 4.

alleges UP&L is liable solely as Larsenfs

Amended Complaint f 18, R. 45.

Mounteer concedes that under no state of facts can it

be proven that UP&L intended or directed Larsen to commit the
intentional torts about which he complains.

Transcript of July

31, 1987, hearing upon motion to dismiss, p. 15, line 9-16;
23-24, R. 164; p. 16, line 10-12, R. 165; p. 18, line 13-20, R.
167.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

Mounteer

alleges

he was

personally

injured

when a

co-employee knowingly and intentionally made false and defamatory
statements about him.

Larsenfs conduct is categorized by the

context

plaintiff

in which

the

tortious conduct.
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pleads

it, as

intentionally

2.

As a matter of law, unless the employer directs its

employee to engage in tortious activity or intends the injurious
act, the employer is not liable for injuries its employee suffers
at the hands of a co-employee.
3.

Larsen's conduct deviated from the purpose of serving

her employer when she knowingly communicated false and defamatory
statements about Mounteer to her fellow employees.

This was not

contemplated by Larsen's authority to act for UP&L.
4.
dismiss

Reference by the court in its order upon a motion to
to

the

fatally

defective

state of

facts alleged by

Mounteer was required and is not the impermissible finding of
facts.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE PLAINTIFF'S CAUSES OF ACTION ARE FOR INTENTIONAL
TORTIOUS ACTS.
Mounteerfs argument to this Court hinges upon the removal of
Larsen's defamatory statements from the intentional tort category, thereby avoiding the holdings of Bryan v. Utah Intern'tl, 533
P. 2d 892 (Utah 1975) and the seminal Utah Supreme Court opinion
upon an employer's liability for the intentional torts of its employee—Barney v. Jewel Tea Co., 104 Utah 292, 139 P. 2d 878
(1943).
The state of facts alleged by Mounteer are that Larsen's
acts were intentional, grossly negligent, malicious, outrageous,
and reckless and that she knowingly defamed him.

-4-

Complaint

H

17, 19 and 21, R. 5, 6; Amended Complaint SI 17, 20 and 22, R.
44, 45.

He even alleges that Larsen persisted in the outrageous

conduct after being informed that her defamatory statements were
being broadcast to a wide audience.

Complaint 5 7, R. 4; Amended

Complaint, $ 7, R. 43. Mounteer has always alleged that Larsen's
conduct was in violation of the policies of her employer, and
therefor that it deviated from her authority and the interests of
the employer.

Complaint f 7 and 16, R. 4, 5.

Mounteer1s

second

cause

of

action,

for

the

intentional

infliction of emotional distress, must be based upon this Court's
opinion in Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 358 P.2d 344 (1961).
The Court defined this cause of action as intentional conduct
having a purpose of inflicting emotional distress or which any
reasonable person would know will inflict emotional distress,
i.e. intentionally harmful conduct.

To state a cause of action,

the

and

conduct

must

be

intolerable

offensive

against

generally accepted standards of decency and morality.
at 347.

the

358 P. 2d

Both of Mounteerfs causes of action are based upon the

same conduct, which must be categorized as intentionally tortious.
II. AN EMPLOYER IS NOT BY THE PRINCIPAL OF RESPONDEAT
SUPERIOR ALONE LIABLE TO AN EMPLOYEE FOR INJURIES INTENTIONALLY
INFLICTED BY A CO-EMPLOYEE.
Bryan v. Utah Intern1 tl., 533 P.2d 892 (Utah 1975) clearly
holds that unless the employer intended the particular harm or
directed the commission of the tort, as a matter of law the
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employer
employee.

is not liable

for the injuries that result to the

Mounteer has not and does not now allege any such

intent or direction by UP&L.
Stating that Bryan only applies to an assault, Appellant's
Brieff p. 14f unreasonably limits its holding.

Bryan reflects

the reality of the work place and the fact that employees do not
always conduct themselves

as the employer wishes.

At times

employees may deviate from their duties and engage in intentional
injurious conduct of many forms.

Unless the employer intended or

directed this deviation, to the employer the injury caused is
"one more

industrial mishap

employer is not liable.

in the

factory,"

for which the

Larson, Workmenf s Compensation Law, §

68.21 at 13-74.
Mounteer tries to distinguish his case from Bryan by stating
that in Bryan the intentional conduct "was totally non-related to
the employment."

Appellant's Brief, p. 15.

However, the facts

in Bryan were that while performing the assigned job of pulling a
cable which was required if Bryan was to perform his job, the
offending employee intentionally and maliciously pulled the cable
so as to strike Bryan.

The act of pulling the cable was certain-

ly to serve the employer's interest.

The circumstances which

gave rise to the tortious acts were certainly related to the
employment of both Bryan and the tortfeasor.

But the reckless

manner in which the cable was moved was not directed or intended
by the employer. Even though both employees were within the
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course and scope of their employment, the employer as a matter of
law was not liable for the injuries suffered by Bryan.
The trial court correctly recognized the similarities of
Mounteer's case to Bryan.

See Transcript p. 15, line 5-12, R.

164? p. 16, line 17-23, R. 165; p. 18, line 13-18, R. 167; p. 19,
line 9-14, R. 168; p. 14, line 5-15, R. 173.
"investigate the plaintiff for drug use."

Larsen was sent to

In violation of UP&L

policy, Larsen engaged in intentional and malicious acts which
UP&L neither directed nor intended.
UP&L is not liable.

Mounteer was injured, but

Any state of facts which Mounteer could

prove does not change this result.
III. UP&L IS NOT LIABLE FOR LARSEN1S ACTS BECAUSE THEY WERE
NOT IN FURTHERANCE OF UP&LfS INTERESTS.
Barney v. Jewel Tea Co., 104 Utah 292, 139 P.2d 878 (1943)
held:
We believe the better rule to be that a
principle is not liable for the willful tort
of an agent which is committed during the
course of his employment unless it is committed in the furtherance of his employer's
interests or unless the employment is such
that the use of force could be contemplated
in its accomplishment. 139 P.2d at 879.
Inherent in the causes of action alleged by Mounteer is
excessive
reason.

and

outrageous

conduct

without

responsibility

or

Such conduct, as a matter of law, is not actuated by the

intent of performing the business of the employer.
Boyd, 403 Pa. 231, 169 A.2d 103 (1961).
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See Lunn v,

In Barney an employee of Jewel Tea Company was responsible
for delivering groceries and collecting payments.

In the process

of performing these duties he committed battery upon a woman who
refused to make payment on her account.

This activity on its

face did not further the employer's interest since the employee
failed to collect on the account and alienated the customer.
Even though the employee was entrusted with collecting money owed
to his employer, the use of physical force was not contemplated
for the performance of the employee of those duties.
Barney also suggests that if there is an acceptable means of
serving the employer's interest, then accomplishing the employer's objective by inappropriate measures is conduct for which the
employer is not liable.

139 P.2d at 880. Larsen was assigned to

investigate Mounteer for illegal drug usage and was expected to
comply with company policy on the subject, the acceptable means
of furthering UP&L's interests.
plate

intentional

and

malicious

The assignment did not contemdefamation

or

inflicting emotional distress rendering Mounteer

intentionally
incapable of

continued employment.
While

Larsen

was

assigned

the

duty

of

investigating

Mounteer, UP&L could not have reasonably anticipated that Larsen
would

knowingly

violate

company

policy

by making

false

and

defamatory statements indiscriminately throughout the work place.
Also, it was not expected that after learning of what she was
doing, that

she would

persist

-8-

in

the

same

intentional

and

outrageous conduct.

Complaint f 7, R. 4; Amended Complaint, \ 7,

R. 43.
Mounteer's citation to Comments C and E to Restatement of
Agency 2d, § 247, does not change the conclusion that Larsen was
not serving the interests of UP&L.

Comment C addresses the

employee who is retained for the specific purpose of speaking for
the

employer.

Larsen

was

not

employed

to

speak

for UP&L.

Comment E addresses the conduct of a person "managing a business."

Larsen was not a manager vested with discretion in the

performance of her duties.
policy was

In fact, Mounteer acknowledges that a

in place governing

violated those policies.

Larsen's duties

and

Complaint JI 7, 9, R. 4.

that she
Larsen was

not given carte blanche authority to proceed as she saw fit and
the only provable

state of

facts

is that she

intentionally

deviated from her authority.
Mounteer also cites Restatement of Agency 2d, § 231, Comment
B, which correctly states that an employer will be liable for
conduct of the employee "it is natural to expect that servants
may do."

The provable state of facts is that Larsen's conduct

was far in excess of what any employer would naturally expect an
employee to do.
Mounteer's citing of Phillips v. JCM Development Corp., 666
P.2d 876 (Utah 1983), also does not alter the accuracy of the
trial court's analysis of his causes of action.

In Phillips the

basis of the broker's liability was based upon a direct relation

-9-

to the injured party and the fact that the principle played an
independent material role in the harmful transaction.

666 P. 2d

at 882-883.
Mounteer also urges this Court to hold that Larsen's subjective belief that she was serving her employer's interests determines the employer's liability.

Appellant's Brief, p. 5.

But if

the tortfeasor employee's reasons for acting is the determining
factor, then in Bryan if the tortfeasor had wanted to expedite
the moving of the cable and did so in an intentional injurious
manner, Utah International would be liable for his assault, a
patently erroneous result.
The
whether

issue

is not Larsen's

knowingly

making

reasons

false

for her conduct but

defamatory

statements

about

Mounteer to his co-employees was contemplated by UP&L for the
performance by Larsen of her duties.

It is obvious that"defaming

anyone and intentionally inflicting emotional distress was not
and could not have been contemplated as part of Larsen's duties.
It is ludicrous to suggest that UP&L's interest could in any way
be furthered by Larsen defaming Mounteer or by inflicting him
with emotional distress through conduct which offends generally
accepted standards of decency and morality, rendering Mounteer
permanently and totally disabled from employment.
11, R. 4; Amended Complaint f 11, R. 44.
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Complaint 3

IV.
THE ORDER OF DISMISSAL PROPERLY CITES THE LEGAL DEFECTS
OF THE ACTION.
The Order and Judgment of Dismissal, R. 125, appropriately
outlines why under any state of facts which may be proven, the
plaintiff failed to state a cause of action upon which relief may
be granted.

The trial court was required by U.R.C.P. 52(a) to

"issue a brief written statement of the ground for its decision,"
because UP&L's motion to dismiss was based upon U.R.C.P. 12(b)
and the motion was based on more than one ground.
The minute entry upon which the Order is based, R. 107, does
no more than (1) accurately set forth the law applicable to the
case, i.e. that the employer must intend or direct the injurious
conduct, (2) and sets forth the state of facts relied upon by the
plaintiff in support of his claim, i.e. that Larsen deviated from
her assigned duties and authority which UP&L neither intended nor
directed and by committing an intentional tort, injured Mounteer.
Under any state of facts which could be proven, as exemplified

by

the two

statements

in the complaint

and amended

complaint, UP&L neither intended nor directed Larsen to engage in
the injurious conduct.

Proof of such intent or direction was an

elemental part of Mounteerfs causes of action and as this was the
only state of facts which could be proven in support of the
claim, as a matter of law, Mounteer failed to state a cause of
action upon which relief may be granted.
It is particularly telling that even after the July 31,
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1987, hearing during which the defects in the complaint were
discussed

by

the

Court

and

Mounteer's

complaint was prepared which made
intention

or

direction

which

is

no

counsel,

attempt

required

by

an

amended

to allege the
Bryan

v. Utah

Intern1tl. if UP&L is to become liable.
Finally, neither Christensen v. Lelis Automatic Transmission
Service, Inc., 24 Utah 2d 165, 467 P.2d 605 (1970), nor any other
opinion which has addressed a motion to dismiss, prohibits the
court from stating why the cause of action fails.
CONCLUSION
UP&L respectfully requests this Court to affirm the Order
and Judgment of Dismissal in its entirety, including the dismissal without prejudice.

UP&L further prays for an award of its

costs incurred in this appeal.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

/8"

day of February 19 88.

UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

Its Attorney
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